(5) 5.

STATE OF INDIA;

IN TWO LETTERS FROM

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

TO THE

COURT OF DIRECTORS;

AND ONE FROM THE

NABOB ASUFUL DOWLA, SUBADAR OF OWDE.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

A SERIES OF EXPLANATORY FACTS AND REMARKS.

Magnoperè vos et hortor et moneo, ut his Provinciis seriùs vos quidem quam decuit, sed aliquandó tamen consulatis.

CICERO. Ep. ad Fam. 15. 1.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRETT, (SUCCESSOR TO MR. ALMON) OPPOSITE BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

MDCCLXXXII.

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moſt

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The Editors beg leave to return their warmeſt thanks to thoſe Noblemen and Gentlemen, by whoſe diſtinguiſhed patronage and aid they have been able to conduct this publication through the laſt and preſent Parliament, in a manner that hath entitled the Work to the approbation of the Public. The communications with which they have been honoured, have been attended to with the utmoſt care, and upon every queſtion the ſtricteſt candour has been obſerved, that the Work might contain a true and faithful account of every important Debate.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

TO THE

HON. THE COURT OF DIRECTORS,

OF THE

HON. UNITED EAST INDIA COMPANY.

FORT WILLIAM, 29th November, 1780.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

YOU will be informed, by our conſultations of the 26th of June, of a very unuſual tender, which was made by me to the board that day, for the purpoſe of indemnifying the company for the extraordinary expence, which might be incurred by ſupplying the detachment under the command of Major Camac, in the invaſion of the Maratta dominions, which lay beyond the diſtrict of Gohud; and drawing the attention of Mhadajee Sindia, to whom that country immediately appertained, from General Goddard, while his was employed

in the reduction of Baſſeen, and in ſecuring the conqueſts made by your arms in Guzerat. I was deſirous to remove the only objection, which had been or could be oſtenſibly made to the meaſure, which I had very much at heart, as may be eaſily conceived from the means which I took to effect it. —For the reaſons at large, which induced me to propoſe that diverſion; it will be ſufficient to refer you to my minute recommending it, and to the letters received from General Goddard, near the ſame period of time. The ſubject is now become obſolete, and all the fair hopes, which I had built upon the proſecution of the Maratta war, of its termination in a ſpeedy, honourable, and advantageous peace, have been blaſted by the dreadful calamities, which have befallen your arms in the dependencies of your preſidency of Fort St. George; and changed the object of our purſuit from the aggrandizement of your power, to its preſervation.—— My preſent reaſon for reverting to my own conduct on the occaſion, which I have mentioned, is to obviate the falſe concluſions or purpoſed miſrepreſentations, which may be made of it either as an artifice of oſtentation,

or

or as the effect of corrupt influence, by assuring you, that the money, by whatever means it came into your possession, *was not my own; that I had myself no right to it, nor would or could have received it, but for the occasion, which prompted me to avail myself of the accidental means, which were at that instant afforded me, of accepting and converting it to the property and use of the company*; and with this brief apology, I shall dismiss the subject.

Something of affinity to this anecdote, may appear in the first aspect of another transaction, which I shall proceed to relate, and of which it is more immediately my duty to inform you.——You will have been advised by repeated addresses of this government, of the arrival of an army at Cuttack, under the command of Chimnajee Boosla, the second son of Shoodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar.

The origin and destination of this force have been largely explained and detailed in the correspondence of the government of Berar, and in various parts of our consulta-

tions. The minute relation of theſe would exceed the bounds of a letter; I ſhall therefore confine myſelf to the principal fact.——About the middle of laſt year, a plan of confederacy was formed by the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, by which it was propoſed that, while the army of the Marattas under the command of Mhadajee Sindia and Tocajee Holdar, was employed to check the operations of General Goddard in the Weſt of India, Hyder Ally Cawn ſhould invade the Carnatic, Moodajee Booſla the province of Bengal, and he himſelf the Sircars of Rajamundry and Chicacole.——The government of Berar was required to accept the part aſſigned it in this combination, and to march a large body of troops immediately into Bengal. To inforce the requeſt on the part of the ruling members of the Maratta ſtate, menaces of inſtant hoſtility by the combined forces were added by Mhadajee Sindia, Tocajee Holdar, and Nizam Ally Cawn, in letters written by them to Mocdajee Booſla on the occaſion. He was not in a ſtate to ſuſtain the brunt of ſo formidable a league, and oſtenſibly yielded.——Such at leaſt was the turn, which he gave to his acquieſcence

acquiescence in his letters to me, and his subsequent conduct has justified his professions. I was early and progressively acquainted by him with the requisition and with the measures, which were intended to be taken and which were taken him upon it.——The army, professedly destined for Bengal, marched on the *Dussorah* of the last year (corresponding with the 7th of October). Instead of taking the direct course to Bahar, which had been prescribed, it proceeded, by varied deviations and studied delays, for Cuttac, where it arrived late in May last, having performed a practicable journey of three months in seven, and concluded it at the instant commencement of the raine, which of course would preclude its operations, and afford the government of Berar a further interval of five months to provide for the part, which it would then be compelled to chuse. ——In the mean time, letters were continually written by the Rajah and his ministers to this government, explanatory of their situation and motives, proposing their mediation and guarantee, for a peace and alliance with the Peshwa; and professing, without solicitation on our part, the most friendly disposition

tion towards us, and the moſt determined reſolution to maintain it.

Conformably to theſe aſſurances, and the acceptance of a propoſal made by the Moodajee Booſla, to depute his miniſters to Bengal, for the purpoſe of negociating and concluding the propoſed treaty of peace, application had been made to the Peſhwa, for credentials to the ſame effect:——In the mean time, the fatal news arrived of the defeat of your army at Conjeveram. It now became neceſſary, that every other object ſhould give place or be made ſubſervient to the preſervation of the Carnatic; nor would the meaſures, requiſite for that end, admit an inſtant of delay. Peace with the Marattas was the firſt object. To conciliate their alliance and that of every other power in natural enmity with Hyder Ally; the next inſtant meaſures were taken (as our general advices will inform you) to ſecure both theſe points, and to employ the government of Berar as the channel and inſtrument of accompliſhing them. Its army ſtill lay on our borders, and in diſtreſs for long arrears of pay, not leſs occaſioned by the want of pecuniary

funds,

funds, than a ſtoppage of commuuicatiou. ——An application had been made to us for a ſupply of money, and the ſum ſpecified for the complete relief of the army was ſixteen ſacks.——We had neither money to ſpare, nor, in the apparent ſtate of that government in its relation to ours, would it have been prudent or conſiſtent with our public credit to have afforded it.——It was nevertheleſs my decided opinion that ſome aid ſhould be given, not leſs as a neceſſary relief, than as an indication of confidence, and a return *for the many inſtances of ſubſtantial kindneſs*, which we had, within the courſe of the two laſt years, experienced from the government of Berar.——*I had an aſſurance that ſuch a propoſal would receive the acquieſcence of the board*;—but I knew that it would not paſs without oppoſition, and it would have become public, which might have defeated its purpoſe.——Convinced of the neceſſity of the expedient, and aſſured of the ſincerity of the government of Berar, from evidences of a ſtronger proof to me, than I could make them appear to the other members of the board, I reſolved to adopt it, and take the entire reſponſibility

of

of it upon myſelf. In this mode, a leſs conſiderable ſum would ſuffice. I accordingly cauſed three Lacks of Rupees to be delivered to the miniſter of the Rajah of Berar reſident in Calcutta. He had it tranſmitted to Cuttack. *Two thirds of this ſum I have raiſed by my own credit, and ſhall charge it in my official accounts,——the other third, I have ſupplied from the caſh in my hands belonging to the honourable Company.* I have given due notice to Moodajee Boolla of this tranſaction, and explained it to have been *a private act of my own, unknown to the other members of the council. I have given him expectation of the remainder of the amount required for the arrears of his army*, proportioned to the extent, to which he may put it in my power to propoſe it as a public gratuity by his effectual orders for the recall of theſe troops, or for their junction with ours.

I hope I ſhall receive *your approbation* of what I have done *for your ſervice*, and your indulgence for the length of this narrative, which I could not comprize within a narrower compaſs.

I have the honour to be

Honourable Sir,

Your moſt faithful, obedient and humble Servant.

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

TO THE

TO THE

COURT OF DIRECTORS,

OF THE

EAST INDIA COMPANY.

FORT WILLIAM, 2d. December, 1780.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

IN the preſent alarming ſituation of your affairs, which their diſtance, the long and momentous interval, which will have paſſed before you can receive the knowledge of them, and the diſſentions which are ever attendant on public calamities will be too apt to exaggerate, you will probably expect that I ſhould inform you of my particular ſentiments concerning them, and I am the more deſirous of conforming to this ſuppoſition, from a belief too ſtrongly founded, that the meaſures neceſſary to the preſervation of your poſſeſſions in India, will inevita-

bly be productive of one conſequence, of which you ought to be early appriſed, that you may be enabled to obviate it in the proviſions, which I underſtand will fall regularly under your conſideration, ſoon after the probable receipt of theſe diſpatches. I have too high a reſpect for the characters to which I addreſs myſelf, to treat them with the management of a preparatory, and gradual introduction of an unpleaſing report, and as it is the only point of ſubſtantial information which I ſhall have to convey to you in this letter, I ſhall therefore make it the firſt ſubject of it.

The conſequence to which I allude, is the neceſſity to which I foreſee that we ſhall be compelled of making a large reduction, and poſſibly a total ſuſpenſion of your inveſtment for the enſuing year. I cannot pronounce what our ability may be beyond that period; this will depend on contingencies too variable and remote for preſent conjecture. ——In juſtification of the meaſure itſelf which I have predicted, I muſt remark, that it will be leſs an act of the board, than, as I have before intimated, the reſult of an unavoid-

unavoidable neceſſity, in which no option will be left us, but either to ſacrifice the temporary profits of the company, or to hazard for ever the exiſtence of all that they poſſeſs for the ſake of retaining them.

It will be impoſſible, at the ſame time, to provide for the vaſt expence which will be required for the ſubſiſtence and defence of both your other preſidencies, and the ſupplies for an inveſtment, in addition to the increaſing exigencies of this government, and all from its own unaſſiſted reſources.

We have been already reduced to the mortifying extremity of borrowing money at intereſt, by which we have raiſed the ſum of, Rupees 64,44,60 1 6.——This reſource cannot laſt.——It muſt ceaſe at a certain period, and that perhaps not diſtant; but the exigency which called it forth will ſtill remain the ſame, and muſt be anſwered. ——We have no other fund from which we can defray it, with the preſent appropriation of our means; for, excluſively of the foreign calls, our own internal expences have accumulated, and will yet increaſe,

not-

notwithſtanding all the care and œconomy that we may uſe to check them; as we muſt replace all the native troops which we have detached to the relief of the Carnatic, and as it is to be apprehended, that our revenue may ſuffer by the large drafts which we ſhall be obliged to make of our current ſpecie.

I will confeſs that I am myſelf more alarmed at the novelty of the meaſure, than convinced of any real detriment of which it will prove to your intereſts, when I conſider that your ſhips are detained in their outſet for months by the want of hands to navigate them, and liable, without any exemption or diſtinction to the ſame hardſhips, as the neceſſities of public ſervice impoſe on common veſſels of trade; that they arrive too late to be all diſpatched in the ſame ſeaſon; that equal delays often attend them in their return, which is accompliſhed with hazards ſo great, that at leaſt a part of their cargoes cannot fail, without great negligence of our national enemies, to fall into their hands, and in that ſenſe ſo much of your inveſtment

may

may be affirmed to be provided for their benefit, equally with your loſs.

I can venture to aſſure you, that every precaution will be taken by this adminiſtration with the advice of the board of trade, to prevent the inconveniencies to which the buſineſs of your inveſtment may be liable, in its renewal from its having been diſcontinued. Reſpecting the expedients which may be recommended for ſupplying the deficiency of your inveſtment, in caſe of its ſtoppage beyond the next year, upon theſe I do not preſume to offer my opinion. They will not eſcape your penetration, and I know that they will be ſuggeſted by a judgment and experience in theſe points ſuperior to my own.

I do not know whether your ſupra cargoes at Canton will ſtand in any need of our aſſiſtance; I ſhould think not; but it is unneceſſary to add, after what I have herein premiſed, that it will be equally out of our power to afford it.

I wait in anxious expectation of an anſwer from the government of Berar to my diſ-

patches

patches, which conveyed the treaty propoſed for its guaranty, and the ratification of the adminiſtration of Poonah. This may arrive in the courſe of another week. I have every reaſon to believe that it will be entirely conſonant to my own wiſhes; with the aid, or even the nutrality of this power, I have no doubt of being able to make the reſources of this government equal to every ſervice, which may be exacted from them, both for the maintenance of the actual peace of theſe provinces, and the reſtoration of your affairs in the Carnatic, however deſperate they may now appear, if they continue under the conduct of your preſent commander in chief.

I can venture to pronunce what may be the determination of the adminiſtration of Poona.——Conſidered as a ſtate, it has certainly every cauſe to dread the aggrandizement of Hyder Ally Cawn, its natural enemy;——as a faction, though not wholly unintereſted in the event of his ſucceſs, it may be influenced by other cauſes; by the ties of confederacy; by its own weakneſs; by the jealouſy of Ragonaut Row; by the aſcendant of Mhadajee Scindia, and his ſeparate

parate views; which are incompatible with peace, and perhaps by national reſentment; yet I think it probable that the example of the government of Berar may contribute to turn the ſcale in our favour; but I have no grounds for ſuch an expectation in any recent act or appearance.

Permit me to offer a brief reflection on the preſent ſtate of your political affairs.——I have been told that the Maratta war has been, I know not on what ground or ſuggeſtion, attributed to me.——Your honourable court is poſſeſſed of the fulleſt evidence of the contrary.——The occaſion of the war was planned and executed without the knowledge or previous concurrence of this government; which has no other participation in it, than in providing, by an extraordinary exertion, for the ſupport of the meaſures undertaken by the preſidency of Bombay, if theſe ſucceeded, and for its preſervation if they failed. Our detachment arrived ſeaſonably for the laſt of theſe objects, and for the redemption of the national honour, which had, without it, been irretrievably loſt. I had indeed flattered myſelf that the war

would

would have ſoon terminated in ſuch advantages, as would have amply atoned for the paſt calamities which had attended it.——Whatever conviction I may entertain of ſuch a concluſion, it is now reduced to an argument of unavailing ſpeculation, in which every perſon is at liberty to form his own opinion.

Another and more intereſting occaſion, has now called for the exertions of this government, in the preſervation of your government at Fort St. George.——This, at leaſt, will not be imputed to the government of Bengal.——If the extorted and palliated confeſſion of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn may be credited, and we have the evidence of the moſt public notority to confirm it, it was the ſole effect of a confederacy formed at his inſtigation, and dictated by his reſentment of the infringments, made by the ſelect committee of Fort St. George, on his rights obtained by the treaty ſubſiſting between him and the company, and his natural apprehenſion of hoſtilities intended by that government againſt him. Whatever be the cauſe, ſuch have been the effects; and it is our duty

to

to do all that may be in our power to avert them. This we have already done to a degree as great as the time and our means would admit.------We have exhauſted our treaſury, we have deprived ourſelves of the flower of our army for their relief; we have abandoned our own meaſures in the criſis of their ſucceſs; we have formed a powerful detachment which will be in a condition to march, in a few days from this date, and have uſed means, which, though new and untried, were the moſt likely to prove of ſpeedy and of certain effect, to win allies to their cauſe, even of our preſent enemies.------ I hope it will not appear the aſſumption of an undue merit to obſerve, that extenſive as the aids are which we have already afforded them, and at a ſeaſon in which the rules of your ſervice have hitherto interdicted the navigation of theſe ſeas, in conſideration of the danger attending it, they arrived in ſafety at Fort St. George in leſs than two months from the date of the ca'amity, which furniſhed the occaſion for them, computed from the return of the army under Sir Hector Munro at the mount, on the 14th of September to the arrival of the laſt ſhip of the

 fleet,

fleet, the Duke of Kingſton, at Fort St. George on the 5th of November.

We ſhall continue to employ the ſame vigilant attention to your intereſts, and I have no fears for the event, while I have the happineſs to poſſeſs my preſent means, with the ſame *able and willing aſſiſtance, which fortune has given me in my preſent aſſociate* in this government.

I moſt humbly beg leave to conclude this letter, with recommendation of Major Popham to your favour. The ſervices, which he has rendered, in the expulſion of the Marattas from the dominions of your ally the Ranah of Ghodud, and eſpecially in the capture of the important fortreſs of Gualier, have given him a claim to my ſolicitation in his behalf; and you will permit me to obſerve, that in whatever mode you may be pleaſed to ſtamp your approbation of his ſervices, you cannot have a more deſerving ſubject for it, nor a ſeaſon, in which the zeal of your ſervants will better entitle them, on every principle of policy, as well as juſtice, to ſuch rewards and encouragements.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Tranſlation of a letter from his Highneſs the Nabob Aſufal Dowla, Subadar of Owde and Vizier of the Empire, to Charles Purling, Eſq. Reſident at his Court, on the part of the Eaſt India Company. Dated Lucknow, 19th of November, 1779.

THE friendſhip between the honourable Company, Mr. Haſtings governor general, the ſupreme council, and myſelf, has not the leaſt ſhadow of diſunion. Dominion, property, and honour are the ſame to us.

The ſituation of my affairs, reſpecting the preſent time, I informed Mr. Middleton of, both by writing and converſation, and I now proceed to lay the whole before you.

During theſe three years paſt, the expence occaſioned by the troops in Brigade and others, commanded by European officers, has much diſtreſſed the ſupport of my houſehold, inſomuch that the allowance made to the ſeraglio and children of the deceaſed Nabob has been reduced to the fourth part of what it was, upon which they have ſubſiſted

ſiſted in a very diſtreſſed manner for theſe two years paſt. The attendants, writers, ſervants, &c. of my court have received no pay for theſe two years, and there is at preſent no part of the country that can be allotted to the payment of my father's private creditors, whoſe applications are daily preſſing upon me.------All theſe difficulties I have for theſe three years paſt ſtruggled through, and found this conſolation therein, that it was complying with the pleaſure of the honourable company, and in the hope that the ſupreme council would make enquiry from impartial perſons into my diſtreſſed ſituation; but I am now forced to a repreſentation.

From the great increaſe of expence, the revenues were neceſſarily farmed out at a high rate, and deficiencies followed yearly. -----The country and cultivation is abandoned; and, this year in particular, from the exceſſive drought of the ſeaſon, deductions of many lacks have been allowed the farmers, who were ſtill left unſatisfied; and I have received but juſt ſufficient to ſupport my abſolute neceſſities; and, for this reaſon

many

many of the old chieftains with their troops and useful attendants of the court were forced to leave it, and now there is left only a few foot and horse for the collection of the revenues; and should the Zemindars be refractory, there is not a sufficient number left to reduce them to the obedience of my collectors,------The late raised brigade at Futtighur is not only quite useless to my government, but is moreover the cause of much loss, both in the revenues and customs;------The detached bodies of troops, under other European officers, *bring nothing but confusion to the affairs of government, and are entirely their own masters.*

In this distressed state of my affairs, it is just and requisite that Mr. Hastings, General Sir Eyre Coote, and the Supreme Council should give me relief.------This year I cannot possibly provide for the new brigade at Futty-Ghur, the corps of horse, and other detached bodies of troops in my country.------I hope you will consider well these representations, and explain them, in a manner you may judge proper, to the Governor General and Supreme Council.------On my part, country,

try, property, and life, are devoted to the will of the honourable Cumpany, and I hope they will therefore do juſtice to theſe my complaints, and prevent my falling into diſtreſs, *by not having wherewith to ſupport the neceſſary expences of my houſhold.*------For the expence of the brigade at Cawnpoor, and other diſburſements, I have given other Tunkas, * and orders upon my country; the remainder of my revenues, on account of the drought, has fallen ſo ſhort, as not to be ſufficient for my neceſſary expences, being deficient to the amount of fifteen lacks, and the above proviſion will bring upon me this year very great diſtreſs.

* *Aſſignments.*

FACTS.

FACTS.

I. ON the 10th of Auguſt 1778, Mr. Barwell affirmed, and produced at the Council board a ſtatement to prove, that the unapplied caſh of that day, in the actual poſſeſſion of government, amounted to current rupees, one hundred and five lacks, twenty thouſand, (105,20,000); and he deſcribed it to be, a real unappropriated treaſure that inſtant in their poſſeſſion. He further added, that, by unappropriated treaſure, he meant all ſums of money, whether in the treaſury or elſewhere, not ſubject to the current diſburſements of government, and totally diſtinct from the annual revenue, which he regarded as appropriated to civil and military charges, and to remittances to

Bombay

Bombay and China, and ſufficient to provide for *all poſſible material demands.*

II. On the ſame day, Mr. Haſtings laid before the board an official eſtimate of reſources and diſburſements, which ſtated an unappropriated balance of current rupees, two hundred and thirty five lacks ſixty ſix thouſand, (2,35,66,000), expected to remain in the company's treaſury, after deducting all the probable diſburſements, from the expected reſources on the 30th of April 1779. From this balance, Mr. Haſtings deducted thirty lacks for extra diſburſements, not provided for in the eſtimate, leaving a *corrected* balance of current rupees, two hundred and five lacks, ſixty thouſand, (2,05,60,000), to exiſt on the 30th of April 1779.

III. From the 1ſt of May, 1778, to November, 1780, the treaſury of Bengal received aids, external to its own reſources, to the amount of current rupees, ſixty two lacks, thirty ſeven thouſand ſeven hundred and five, viz.

Amount

	Cur. Rupees.
Amount of Monies received for draughts on the Court of Directors,	52,21,705
Extra contribution from Cheitsing, Raja of Benares,	10,16,000
Total, Cur. Rupees,	62,37,705

IV. On the 30th of November, 1780, all the preceding ſurpluſſes, and ſavings, if they ever exiſted, were gone, together with all the extraordinary ſupplies; and the ſtate of the Bengal treaſury ſtood as follows.

Cr.	Cur. Rup.	Dr.	Cur. Rup.
Ready Money, —	4,63,725	Amount of bonded debt, and depoſits of private property, — —	83,27,239
Bills, — — —	1,19,972		
Mint, — — —	98,443		
Unſorted Treaſure, eſtimated at —	12,94,584	Orders iſſued on the Treaſury, and not diſcharged, —	8,62,944
	19,76,724		91,90,183
Balance againſt the Treaſury, —	72,13,459		

IV. On the 30th of April, 1780, the bonded debt of Bombay ſtood at Bombay rupees, fifty lacks, eighty nine thouſand

two hundred and thirteen, (50,89,213). Their diſburſements for the year ending in April, 1781, were eſtimated by themſelves at Bombay rupees, ſeventy five lack, eighty one thouſand two hundred eighty nine, (75,81,289). Their reſources for the ſame period, are eſtimated at Bombay rupees, thirty ſeven lacks, forty ſix thouſand ſeven hundred and ninety ſeven, (37,46,797). The exceſs of the diſburſements added to the bonded debt, will make the whole debt againſt that preſidency on the 30th of April, 1781, amount to Bombay rupees, eighty nine lacks, twenty three thouſand ſeven hundred and five, (89,23,705). At the foot of the eſtimate it is obſerved, that, "As the re-"venues from the late acquiſitions are not "eſtimated in this account, ſo neither are the "advances, which may be made to Gene-"ral Goddard's army."——If any portion of the expences be defrayed by ſupplies from Bengal, the effect will be rather worſe, on on the whole, than if the money were entirely borrowed at Bombay; ſince an equal debt muſt be incurred in Bengal, with the addition of the riſque and expence of ſending the amount in ſpecie, or of the difference of exchange

exchange and premium on a remittance by bills. In autumn 1779, five lacks of rupees, deſtined for Bombay, were actually loſt in the Stafford. The loſs on the head of exchange, from Calcutta to Bombay or Surat, has been conſtantly from ſix to ten per cent. It appears on the conſultations, that it was ſolely owing to the ſtrenuous oppoſition of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, that ten lacks (propoſed by Mr. Haſtings, and voted for by Mr. Barwell), were not loſt inſtead of five on board the Stafford.

V. From April 1778, to November 1780, the actual expence of the government of Bengal, incurred on account of the Maratta war alone, and for the ſupport of the eſtabliſhments at Bombay, amounted to almoſt one hundred and ſeventy ſix lacks of current rupeees, viz.

	Current Rupees.
Remitted to Bombay,	43,45,640 12 9
To General Goddard's army, ——	1,18,85,808 12 1
To Major Camac's firſt detachment,	4,55,551 13 5

		Current Rupees.
Brought over	—	1,66,87,000 10 3
Major Popham's detachment,	—	6,25,403 13 1
Major Camac's ſecond detachment,	—	2,70,583 3 3
Total, Cur. Rup.		1,75,82,988 6 7

To this ſum ſhould be added the ſum of three lacks of Sicca rupees, (or current rupees, (3,48,000), given privately in November, 1786, by Mr. Haſtings, without the knowledge of the Governor General and Council, to the Maratta army then ſtationed in Cuttac, near the frontier of Bengal.

The ſum total muſt be conſidered as part of the price, at which the acquiſitions of territory, ſaid to have been made on the Malabar coaſt, have been certainly purchaſed. When the Maratta war ſhall be at an end, and all the military eſtabliſhments, created to ſupport it, ſhall have been paid off and reduced; the India Company, if they pleaſe to enquire, may know the amount

of

of their expence on this head. When they have aſcertained the net balance, ariſing from the revenues of theſe acquiſitions and applicable to other ſervices, after all expences of management and of new military eſtabliſhments to defend a new frontier, ſhall be allowed for and defrayed, they will then know the real value of the thing they have acquired.——And finally, by comparing the price with the value, they may be enabled to comprehend, how much they have loſt or gained by the whole tranſaction. At preſent, they are not quite ſure of any thing but their actual expence.

VI. As mere matter of fact, it is rather more evident, that the great unappropriated ſurplus, of two hundred and five lacks, ſixty thouſand current rupees, which Mr. Haſtings aſſured the Company, would exiſt in their treaſury in Bengal, on the 30th of April 1779, does not exiſt there at preſent, than that it ever did exiſt in the ſaid treaſury. Admitting the latter fact nevertheleſs, on Mr. Haſtings' authority, to be as evident as the other, it is as clear as either of them, that on the principles aſſumed and inſiſted on

by

by Mr. Barwell and Mr. Haſtings, the extraordinary expences of the war will not account for the diſappearance of the ſurplus abovementioned, and for the ſubſequent debt incurred. Mr. Barwell affirms that the annual revenue was ſufficient to provide for *all poſſible material demands*; and Mr. Haſtings, after deducting, not only ALL *the probable diſburſements* from the expected reſources, but alſo thirty lacks for extra-diſburſements, inſiſts on his *corrected* balance of 205,60,000 currents, and aſſerts that it would exiſt in the treaſury on the 30th of April, 1779. Yet, at the end of November, 1780, the whole of this great unappropriated ſurplus was gone, together with large ſums obtained by draughts on the court of directors, and excluſive of and in addition to the whole revenue of Bengal, &c. and, beſides all this, a bonded debt at eight per cent. incurred, to the amount of ſeventy lacks.——Is it poſſible that neither the Company or Parliament ſhould ever aſk what is become of all this money?

VII. Within a year after the arrival of General Clavering, Colonel Monſon and Mr.

Mr. Francis in Bengal, a bonded debt of a hundred and ten lacks, which they found exiſting, was paid off; and from the years 1775 to 1780 inclusive, above a hundred and ten lacks per annum, one year with another, was allotted and paid to the commercial board out of the territorial revenues, for the purchaſe of an inveſtment for the Eaſt India Company.———Under prudent management, ſuch and ſo great was the public gratuitous tribute returned by Bengal to Great Britain, excluſive of the amount of private fortunes remitted in the ſame period!———Mr. Haſtings now fairly tells the Company, *that he ſhall be compelled to make a large reduction, and poſſibly a total ſuſpenſion of their inveſtment for the year* 1781; *and that he cannot pronounce what their ability may be beyond that period*; and the Court of Directors have empowered the Governor General and Council, to *draw on the Company* for fifty lacks, to be applied to the purchaſe of an inveſtment, leſt, if it were totally ſuſpended, the manufactures ſhould be loſt. Such are the effects of *war and conqueſt!*

On

On the 19th of May, 1777, Mr. Francis, in the courſe of a debate on a propoſed augmentation of the army, took occaſion to obſerve, *that the augmenting the ſtanding force of the country, in order to promote circulation, was a new idea*; and that, without ſuch augmentation, *the ſurplus of caſh, then exiſting in the treaſury, might be gradually ſunk and appropriated.*——The Court of Directors took fire at this intimation, and affected to receive it with indignation and abhorrence. Their remark on the ſubject, with Mr. Francis's reply to it, ſtands as follows.

General letter, 4th of March, 1778.
Paragraph 70th.

"We agree with Mr. Francis that the "idea of augmenting a ſtanding army, in "order to promote circulation, is perfectly "new; and that, in operation, it might be "deſtructive to the country; but we differ "totally from Mr. Francis in his ſuppoſition, "*that the preſent ſurplus exiſting in our trea-*"*ſury, can, with proper management, ever* "*be abſorbed in the ſupport of our government,* "*and the proviſion of our inveſtment*; nor do "we need better authority for this opi-

"nion,

" nion, than his own very able and accurate " ſtatement of internal reſources and of ſer- " vices, to be provided for in Bengal; which, " after propoſing a deduction of ten per cent. " upon the whole revenue for the relief of " the provinces, allowing twenty lacks for " other ſettlements, and appropriating upwards " of ninety lacks for commerce, eſtabliſhes an " *unappropriated*, and, as he juſtly obſerves, " an increaſing ſurplus of more than ten " lacks per annum, excluſive of the ſubſidy " of thirty-one lacks paid by the Vizier, and " of all external reſources ariſing from bills " of exchange, and from the ſales of our Eu- " ropean cargoes."

MINUTE OF Mr. FRANCIS.

November, 16, 1778.

" I am far from preſuming to affirm, nor " would I be underſtood to believe, that any " one opinion of mine, however deliberately " formed, may not be erroneous. But, I " confeſs, I am not equally ready to admit, " that my opinions ſtand mutually in contra- " diction, or that any one of them includes

"or amounts to a compleat refutation of any "other. Error of judgment is no defence "againſt a charge of inconſiſtency.

"The Court of Directors, in the 70th "paragraph of their letter of the 4th of "March, 1778, are pleaſed to ſay, that they "differ totally from me in a ſuppoſition ſtated "in a former minute of mine, that the ſur- "plus exiſting in our treaſury in May, 1777, "could, *with proper management*, EVER be "abſorbed in the ſupport of their govern- "ment, or in the proviſion of their inveſt- "ment; and that for this opinion they need "no better authority, than my own ſtatement "of reſources and ſervices, ſent home in Ja- "nuary, 1776, which eſtabliſhes an unap- "propriated and increaſing ſurplus of ten "lacks, after all demands and ſervices are "provided for.

"In the firſt of the preceding declarations "attributed to me, I ſee plainly I have not "had the good fortune to make myſelf un- "derſtood. I am ſuppoſed to affirm that, "*notwithſtanding proper management*, the "ſurplus exiſting in May, 1777, might ſtill

"be

" be abſorbed in current ſervices, including
" the inveſtment. The propoſition, with
" the condition annexed to it by the Court
" of Directors, is ſuch a one, as I have no
" idea of attempting to ſupport. *With proper*
" *management* the reſources of Bengal are
" undoubtedly equal to its expences, as they
" ſtood in January, 1776, including com-
" mercial charges at 93 lacks.——But, ſo
" far from ſuppoſing *proper* management
" in the revenues and expences of this go-
" vernment, my whole argument implies
" the contrary; and, if *improper* manage-
" ment is ſuppoſed to prevail, I preſume it
" is not hazarding much to ſay, that a ſur-
" plus, exiſting in the treaſury at any given
" period, may be gradually appropriated and
" abſorbed.——This is the utmoſt, that the
" opinion, expreſſed in my minute of the
" 19th of May, 1777, amounts to.

" With reſpect to the unappropriated ſur-
" plus, eſtabliſhed by my ſtatement of re-
" ſources and ſervices, ſent home in January,
" 1776, I muſt entreat the attention of the
" Court of Directors to the following obſer-
" vations.

" The ſtatement makes part of a plan of " ſettlement of the lands, and cannot be ſe- " parated from it. The firſt direct object of " the plan is to ſecure private property. " This I conſider as the wiſeſt, the moſt be- " nevolent, and the ſureſt means of arriving " at my ultimate object, the ſecurity of the " public revenue. I mean that regular " and permanent revenue, on which alone " a wiſe government ought to place its de- " pendance. Extortion and violence may " obtain greater returns, for a ſhort time; " but theſe are the reſources of profuſion. " They are equally incompatible with " œconomy, and ruinous to regular revenue. " If agency or farming were not, as I " deem it, the direct and intended inſtru- " ment of extortion, ſtill it could never ſup- " ply the place of proprietorſhip; becauſe " many of the principal duties of a propri- " tor are ſuch, as an agent or farmer has " no perſonal intereſt in performing. But " theſe duties are eſſential to the permanent " proſperity of the government itſelf, ſince " they belong to the care and improvement " of that fund, from which government re- " ceives its ſupport.

" Now

" Now it is not the mere name of pro-
" prietor, that will engage any man to per-
" form theſe duties, if he has not a *real* ſe-
" curity, that he ſhall not be robbed of the
" ſurplus produce of his induſtry and labour;
" that is, if he does not know, once
" for all, how much he is to pay to govern-
" ment, and be not aſſured that the remain-
" der will be his own.

" A plan of ſettlement, formed on theſe
" principles, may ſafely promiſe a revenue
" exceeding our expences as they were eſti-
" mated in the ſtatement, which accompa-
" nied the plan. The ſurplus too in all ap-
" pearance, may fairly be deemed an increaſ-
" ing fund. But, unleſs we adopt the pre-
" miſes, we have no right to the conclu-
" ſion. Whenever the Court of Directors
" ſhall give us their direct and unreſerved
" approbation of the plan, with a compleat
" authority to carry it into execution, they
" will be entitled to all the benefits and ad-
" vantages, which the plan promiſes to
" produce.——Until they do ſo, it is not
" poſſible, in *my* judgment at leaſt, that their
" territorial acquiſitions and revenues can

" be

" be *properly* managed. It is for *them* to " judge of the effects of *improper* manage- " ment ; how ſoon it may exhauſt the " funds that exiſt, or at what period, and by " what gradations it may operate to the ruin " of their revenues."

P. FRANCIS.

IX. It appears by Mr. Haſtings's letter of the 29th of November, 1780, to the Court of Directors, that he had actually given away three lacks of the Company's money to the commanding officer of a Maratta army, then ſtationed near the frontier of Bengal, that he had promiſed thirteen more to the Raja of Berar, to whom that army belonged ; and that he had done all this without the conſent or knowledge of the Council General, that is, of the government of Bengal.——It is the act of an individual, who has acceſs to the Company's treaſure, and is no more authoriſed in Mr. Haſtings, than it would have been in the ſub-treaſurer, Mr. Croftes. The Court of Directors, who are themſelves only truſtees for the Company, are bound to conſider,

ſider, whether they *can* give their *approbation* avowedly to an unlawful act, though ſaid to be *done for their ſervice*. Whether the precedent it eſtabliſhes be not of a very dangerous nature; and if they allow the firſt or any other member of the government, to take money *ſecretly* out of their treaſury at his pleaſure in one inſtance, by what limits they can bind or reſtrain the exerciſe of ſuch diſcretionary power hereafter.

The Company's Inſtructions to the Governor General and Council, containing the following ſtrict Injunction on this head.

"WE direct that all monies, which may "ariſe from our revenues, or be received by "you on our account, be ſecured under three "locks as uſual, that the keys be kept by "the Governor General, and ſuch other "Members of Council as you ſhall appoint, "who ſhall be a Committee of Treaſury; "that exact particulars of all monies, paid "into our treaſury, be firſt regularly entered "on your conſultations, ſpecifying from "whom received, and on what account;

"and

" and that all iſſues of money from our ſaid " Treaſury, be made by warrant under your " hands, directed to the Committee of Trea- " ſury, *and not otherwiſe.*"

It is alſo their duty to conſider the precedent, ſet by Mr. Haſtings, in another very important point of view:——Whether to give money to a Maratta army, in order to induce them not to invade Bengal, could be, at any time and in any circumſtances, a firm and ſpirited meaſure;—whether it could even be a prudent and judicious meaſure, in any ſituation of the government of Bengal, but that of the laſt extremity and diſtreſs;—and whether, in every view, in which the meaſure can be conſidered, it does not acknowledge the exiſtence of ſuch diſtreſs, and proclaim it to the world. Another queſtion would finally occur to men, who had any ſenſe of the truſt repoſed in them, or of the duty they owe not only to their immediate conſtituents, but to the King and to the Nation;—viz. by what means and by whoſe miſconduct Bengal has been reduced, in the ſhort ſpace of three years, from the ſecure and proſperous ſtate, in which it ſtood at the end of the year,

1777,

1777, to the diſtreſſes with which it was ſurrounded, and to the hazard of ruin, to which it was expoſed, at the end of the year, 1780?

X. Mr. Haſtings, in the ſame letter, ſays; —*I had an aſſurance that ſuch a propoſal would receive the acquieſcence of the board; but I knew that it would not paſs without oppoſition.* The board at that time conſiſted of the Governor General, Mr. Francis, and Mr. Wheler.—Sir Eyre Coote was at Fort St. George; and if he had been preſent, it would be unfair to him to ſuppoſe, on any authority leſs than his own, that the commander in chief of the Company's forces, would have ſubſcribed to a meaſure ſo humiliating to the government of Bengal, and ſo diſgraceful to the Britiſh arms.——Undoubtedly he would rather have joined with Mr. Francis, in demanding a categorical anſwer from the Marattas in Cuttac, and inſiſting on their inſtant removal, or an explicit declaration of their intentions. The Governor General and Council had already temporiſed with them long enough.——But three years before the period in queſtion, the Britiſh

power predominated and was dreaded all over India. In November 1780, the Governor General pays a tribute to a Maratta army to prevent their invading Bengal.—— Conſiderations of this nature would probably have occurred to Sir Eyre Coote, and determined his conduct.

In his minute of the 4th of September, after ſtating the infinite prejudice and miſchief we ſuffered by the continuance of this Maratta army on our frontier, he ſays, "It "is my opinion, that, under whatever autho- "rity they may be, an immediate application "ſhould be made for them to retire, as their "remaining where they are diſturbs the peace "of our provinces. This requiſition will ſoon "diſcover the reality of their intentions to- "wards us. And, in order that we may not "ſuffer ourſelves to be further injured by "delays, time ſhould be ſtipulated for re- "ceiving an anſwer. Should this be denied "us, our own ſafety and intereſt will dictate "to us how to act."

It remains then to be aſcertained, between Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, by which of them

them the *aſſurance* was given to Mr. Haſtings, *that ſuch a propoſal would receive the acquieſcence of the board*, and by which of them he *knew* it would be oppoſed.——The Secret committee of the Houſe of Commons will of courſe make this point one of the objects of their inveſtigation, and demand an explanation of it from Mr. Francis, and Major Scott,—the Governor's authoriſed agent. The honour of Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis is at ſtake,

XI. It is aſſerted, in the ſame letter from Mr. Haſtings, that the extraordinary expence was *the only objection, which had been, or could be oſtenſibly made to a meaſure, which he had very much at heart.* A very different ſtatement of that matter is exhibited in the minutes of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, dated in June 1780. At preſent it is ſufficient for the vindication of thoſe gentlemen, to join iſſue with Mr. Haſtings, by meeting his aſſertion with a direct denial.——Into this point alſo, the [redacted] committee will undoubtedly enquire. Secret

XII. The Company and the Public have received the moſt flattering accounts, of the happy effects of Brigadier General Goddard's march acroſs India, of his ſucceſſes againſt the Marattas, and of great acquiſitions of territory in Guzzerat. Leaving this whole repreſentation of facts to ſtand undiſputed for the preſent, and leaving the ultimate value of ſuch ſucceſſes and acquiſitions, to be adjuſted by the Company at a future day, when they have aſcertained the entire amount of their expence;—it is immediately of moment to obſerve, that the merit of the meaſure, whatever it may be, and whether eſtimated by its own intrinſic policy or merely by the event, does not belong to Mr. Haſtings, as the public have been induſtriouſly taught to believe, but on the contrary has been expreſly diſclaimed by him. In his minute of the 4th of March, 1779, he ſays, "I wiſh equally with Mr. Francis "for the *return* of the detachment into Be- "rar, and equally dread to hear of its pro- "ceeding to the oth[illegible]oaſt." And happy would it have been for India and for England, if General Goddard had immediately turned back, ſuppoſing he could have reached the province

province of Corah in ſafety, from whence the detachment commenced its march about a year before. The laſt accommodation with the Marattas, would then have ended the war on the Malabar coaſt. The preſidency of Bombay could not have taken up arms againſt their inoffenſive neighbours *a third time*. The peace of India, with any tolerable degree of prudence and moderation on our ſide, might have been re-eſtabliſhed and ſecured. Hyder Ally would never have ventured ſingly to attack the Engliſh power; and, in all human probability, none of the diſtreſſes and diſaſters, which have ſince befallen us, would have taken place. But it pleaſed God, by whom all things are deſignedly permitted to come to paſs, that General Goddard never ſaw an enemy, and accompliſhed his march without oppoſition.

At that point of time, when the board had juſt heard of the defeat and ſurrender of the Bombay army to the Marattas near Poona, every member of it felt great and apparently equal anxiety for General Goddard's ſafety. The reſolution he took, to proceed from the Weſtern frontier of Berar to Surat, ſeemed

to

to be dictated by neceſſity, and the execution of it did him credit; but it was not warranted by the orders of the board; nor was it compatible with the propoſed terms of Mr. Haſtings's project of an offenſive alliance with the Raja of Berar, which General Goddard had inſtructions and full powers to conclude.

The event of thoſe pernicious meaſures, which forced the Marattas into a war with the India Company's ſervants and repreſentatives, at the expence of their conſtituents in the firſt inſtance, and ultimately of the nation, and the ruinous conſequences of every ſort, with which it has been attended, are likely enough to alarm the parties concerned. Each of them will now of courſe endeavour to fling his reſpective portion of guilt and reſponſibility, upon his neighbour; that is, the ſame men, who would have contended for the honour of adviſing the meaſure, if it had ſucceeded, will now be as eager to diſclaim it. There is no other imaginable ground or principle, on which the following declaration of Mr. Haſtings can be accounted for. "I have been told that the Maratta

"war,

"war, I know not on what ground or sug-
"gestion, is attributed to me. Your honour-
"able Court is possessed of the fullest evi-
"dence of the contrary. The occasion of
"the war was planned and executed, with-
"out the knowledge and previous concur-
"rence of this government."

These assertions will be received in India, where men and things are better known than at home, with universal amazement. In England, if the question ever comes to issue before a competent tribunal, they will be opposed and overpowered by a long series of indisputable facts, and by evidence of every quality and degree, of which the subject is capable; particularly by the recorded declarations of Mr. Hastings himself, in a multiplicity of instances.

For the present, opposing one assertion to another, it is sufficient to say, that the merit or demerit of the Maratta war belongs wholly and solely to Mr. Hastings; and that the Court of Directors are possessed of the fullest evidence of the truth of this proposition; so

full

full indeed and ſo voluminous, that it is probable they have never examined it.

Admitting that *the occaſion of the war was planned* by the preſidency of Bombay, it is nevertheleſs a fact, that their plan was communicated in proper and ſufficient time, to the government of Bengal, without whoſe *conſent and approbation, firſt had and obtained*, it could not have been carried into execution; and that it did receive their *previous concurrence*, in the cleareſt and moſt explicit terms, in which ſuch concurrence could be expreſſed. It is not eaſy to determine what is meant by *executing an occaſion*. The plain matter of fact is, that the original plan of the gentlemen of Bombay was known to the Governor General and Council, in January 1778, and highly approved of, when it might have been condemned and effectually prohibited by them; and that no attempt was made at Bombay to carry it into execution, until November following. The preſidency of Bombay have enough to anſwer for in the courſe of this unfortunate tranſaction, without being made reſponſible for the acts or reſolutions of a ſuperior power, whoſe concur-

concurrence they ſolicited, whoſe approbation they received, and whoſe orders they were obliged to obey.

With reſpect to the Governor General and Council, if the Maratta war *is not to be attributed to* Mr. *Haſtings*, ſupported by Mr. Barwell, that is, to the perſons, who had the whole political power of India in their hands, and who might have prevented the war with the ſame eaſe and effect with which they approved, encouraged, ſupported, and plunged themſelves and the India Company, and the nation headlong into it ;—in the name of truth and juſtice, to whom *are* we to attribute the Maratta war ?——There never was an example of a more ſtrenuous, ſteady, perſevering, and ineffectual oppoſition to any meaſure, than that, with which it was conſtantly reſiſted and condemned by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, for almoſt three years together. If therefore it does not belong to Mr. Haſtings, it is *an effect without a cauſe*.

Whatever may be the deciſion of this part of the queſtion, no man will now deny, that

the war itſelf is the *cauſe* of the ruin, which deſolates India, and that it has actually converted our territorial acquiſitions in that country, from a great and powerful reſource, into an inſupportable burthen to Great Britain. The time is coming, when the Eaſt India Company and the nation will know, to their coſt, that India may be loſt, without loſing a foot of the ground on which we ſtood. In every ſenſe, in which India, but four years ago, was a reſource and a benefit, of the firſt magnitude, it is at this moment a diſtreſs and a burthen to England. In proper time and place, if parliament will give audience to the queſtion, it will be *proved* that the Maratta war (let who will be the author of it) is the true ſource and origin, of all the miſchief and diſgrace that has fallen upon us in India, and of every diſtreſſing conſequence, which we have ſtill to ſuffer, when the period of direct and immediate diſaſters ſhall be paſt.

Obſervations, numerous and important, occur at almoſt every ſentence of the two preceding letters from Mr. Haſtings. But it would be unwiſe to preſs ſo much matter at once on the public, and unreaſonable to expect ſo general

general an attention to it, as in truth it would deſerve. Yet ſome paſſages, in theſe letters, are too ſingular, as well as too material, not to demand particular notice.

The Governor, after telling the Company, "that they (the Governor General and "Council) ſhall be compelled to make a "large reduction, and poſſibly a total ſuſ-"penſion of the Company's inveſtment for "the enſuing year, and that he cannot pro-"nounce what their ability may be beyond "that period;" proceeds to comfort them with the following conſolation;—"that "he is more alarmed at the *novelty* of the "meaſure, than convinced of its proving any "*real* detriment to their intereſts;—that "their ſhips are detained by the want of "hands to navigate them, and liable to hard-"ſhips in common with other trading veſ-"ſels;—that they arrive too late to be all "diſpatched in the ſame ſeaſon;—that their "return is liable to delays and hazards;—"and that a part of their cargoes cannot "fail of falling into the hands of the enemy, "for whoſe benefit conſequently ſo much of

" the inveſtment may be affirmed to be pro-
" vided."

From theſe *ſelf-evident* principles, Mr. Haſtings, leaves it to the India Company to conclude, if they think proper, that, conſidering all circumſtances, it is more for their advantage not to have an inveſtment provided in Bengal, than to have one. Yet if the ſteward of a great family, poſſeſſing their confidence and intruſted with the care of their income, inſtead of providing a ſubſiſtance for the family, ſhould gravely tell them, *that all their money was gone, but that they had no reaſon to regret the loſs of it, for that, if he had been able to provide a dinner for them, ſome part of it would probably have been ſtolen in its paſſage from the kitchen*; they, who had no immediate reaſon to weep, would laugh at his diſcourſe, while they admired the ſerenity, with which it was delivered.

How the Court of Proprietors may reliſh this doctrine, I know not. For myſelf, and as one of that body, I proteſt againſt it, not only as eſſentially injurious to my intereſts, but

but as an outrage to my underſtanding. The Court of Directors, it is to be preſumed, have not entirely concurred in opinion with Mr. Haſtings; ſince, inſtead of acquieſcing in his reaſons for ſtopping the inveſtment, they have, immediately on the peruſal of thoſe reaſons, ordered an inveſtment to be purchaſed with money *remitted from England*. Yet, on *his* principles, the moment the nation is at war with France, the Eaſt India Company ought to ſhut up ſhop, or at leaſt ſend no more ſhips to ſea, for fear of their being taken by the enemy. Puſh the ſame ſort of reaſoning to its obvious and unavoidable concluſion, and *all* foreign trade muſt be ſuſpended, as long as the enemy are able to keep the ſea. The India Company, in moſt of its commercial operations, repreſents a great merchant, and acts or ought to act as a merchant ought to do. The eſſential difference between ſuch a trading corporation and a trading individual is, that the former may run riſques, to which the latter ſhould not expoſe his fortune. In conformity to the ſpirit of this diſtinction, the Company never inſure their ſhips. But extraordinary occaſions require extraordinary principles,

principles, which too often find a reception and eſtabliſhment in the credulity or inattention of mankind. There is a privilege annexed to novelty, of which a cunning man may avail himſelf, and which a wiſe man will not abuſe.

Mr. Haſtings, ſpeaking of the invaſion and ruin of the Carnatic by Hyder Alley, is pleaſed to ſay, *this, at leaſt, will not be imputed to the government of Bengal.* Mr. Haſtings is ſupported by a numerous and powerful party, who will ſuffer nothing that happens in India, to be attributed to its true cauſe. The truth of this propoſition however, though ſuppoſed to be indiſputable, is nevertheleſs poſitively denied. The queſtion will aſſuredly be brought forward in proper time, and the judgment of parliament demanded upon it.

Without defending any part of the conduct of the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, which it is their own buſineſs to juſtify if they can, it is affirmed and will be maintained, that the invaſion and ruin of the Carnatic, originated from meaſures projected and

and acts done by Mr. Haſtings and no where elſe; or that if any part of the impuſation can be removed from him, it muſt be tranſferred to the projects of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, to which Mr. Haſtings gave encouragement, approbation, and promiſed ſupport; though he ſoon deſerted thoſe very projects, in favour of another of his own, and ſuffered them to fail for want of that aſſiſtance, which he had engaged to afford them. Such at leaſt was the event of his meaſures, but not the only effect they produced. If the Maratta war had not been undertaken or continued, there could have been no union between Hyder Alley and the Marattas; but, on the contrary, the war, then exiſting between thoſe powers, would have continued, and the Carnatic would not have been invaded. It was but in 1777, that the preſidency of Bombay furniſhed Hyder with ſix thouſand ſtand of arms, to enable him to proſecute his operations againſt the Marattas.

With reſpect to the veiws and operations of Hyder Ally, it is a fact, of which abundant proof will be exhibited from the conſultations of the

the Governor General and Council, that before his army was actually on the frontiers of the Carnatic in July 1780, Mr. Haſtings would never admit the poſſibility of his attacking the Engliſh, much leſs of his uniting with his *natural enemies* the Marattas. In truth they were ſo, nor could any thing have united them, but the meaſures of Mr. Haſtings. In this idea he conſtantly and uniformly perſiſted, and for ſome time, even impoſed it on the council, notwitſtanding he had repeated and poſitive advices, for a year before, from the preſidency of Fort St. George, of the hoſtile intentions of Hyder Ally, and of his intimate union with the Marattas and the Nizam. He confided in his own ſuperior knowledge of the political views and intereſts of thoſe powers, and, as uſual, was utterly miſled and deceived by it. In January 1780, Mr. Francis perceived and was convinced of the great miſtake, into which Mr. Haſtings, perhaps undeſignedly, had drawn the government of Bengal on this ſubject, and was alarmed at the conſequences, that might attend it. The following minutes, written on the occaſion, deſerve attention.

Mr.

January the 17th, 1780.

"Mr. Francis desires it may be mentioned, that he is informed by a private "letter of the first authority from Fort St. "George, that it is now certain that the Ma-"rattas and Hyder Ally have formed an "alliance."

Governor General. "That a peace "may have taken place between Hyder "Ally and the Marattas, I do not doubt, "my own advices confirm it, but no alliance "between them can be of long duration, "as it is unnatural. I am convinced, from "the whole tenor of Hyder Ally's conduct "and disposition, *that he will never molest* "*us*, whilst we endeavour to preserve a good "understanding with him. These were "lately Mr. Francis's sentiments as well as "mine, and his distrust of the same autho-"rity on the same subject I recollect to have "been yet stronger marked, than my own "(see consultation 20th December). I "therefore object to this information being "given to the Court of Directors, in the

"general

" general letter, *as only tending to alarm* " *them without ſufficient cauſe for it.*"

MR. FRANCIS. " The intelligence I " have ſtated to the board is of a much " later date than that, which the Governor " General alludes to. It contains the poſi- " tive aſſertion of a fact, to which I cannot " refuſe giving credit, conſidering the autho- " rity I have for it. It does not ſay any " thing of Hyder Ally's intentions to invade " the Carnatic. That was the point, on " which I entertained the diſtruſt alluded to " by the Governor, but even that diſtruſt " may be removed by new facts and later " advices."

It is of little moment, in the preſent queſ- tion, whether the conduct of the Preſidency of Fort St. George towards the *Nizam* can be defended or not. The Governor General and Council were *unanimous* in condemning their proceedings, as well in the affair of the Guntoor Circar, as in the detention of the Peſhcuſh, or annuity due to him by treaty. Mr. Haſtings could not take a ſtronger and more decided part in that buſineſs, than was taken

taken by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, who had no perſonal animoſity to Sir Thomas Rumbold. The great point, on which the affirmative will be maintained and eſtabliſhed againſt Mr. Haſtings, in his own terms, is, that the conduct of the Preſidency of Fort St. George to the Nizam, though he complained of it with reaſon, was not and could not be the cauſe of *the plan of the confederacy formed by the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, about the middle of the year* 1779. Mr. John Hollond, who was deputed to him by the government of Fort St. George in May, 1779, for the ſpecial purpoſe of facilitating the acquiſition of the Guntoor Circar, did not open to him the ſubject of his deputation until the eighth of that month.* As to the remiſſion of the *Peſhcuſh*, which gave the principal offence, it was never mentioned to him till the 24th of June. But nothing ſaid or done at that time, however offenſive to the *Nizam*, could be the cauſe of a plan of confederacy, which, by the terms of the propoſition, he muſt already have

 formed

* *Vide Appendix to the ſecond report of the Secret Committee. No.* 116, &c.

formed between Hyder Ally, the Maratta government at Poona, the Raja of Berar, and himſelf. Leagues and alliances, between great and very diſtant princes, are not ſo ſpeedily negociated or ſo eaſily accompliſhed. The truth is that the Nizam's reſolution to endeavour to unite all India againſt the Engliſh, took its riſe from an act of Mr. Haſtings, in which the intereſts and ſafety of the Nizam were much more deeply concerned, than they could be by any diſpoſition of the Guntoor Circar, (on which the Company had an undiſputed claim of ſucceſſion) or by the detention of a paultry tribute of two or three lacks a year. In July 1778, Mr. Haſtings deputed the late Mr. Alexander Elliot to Moodajee Booſla, the *ſuppoſed* Raja of Berar (for it has ſince been affirmed by Mr. Haſtings, that this man is not the *true* Raja, but only acts for his ſon) with inſtructions and full powers to conclude an offenſive alliance with him, one of the avowed objects of which was to make war on the Nizam, and to diſpoſſeſs him of a conſiderable portion of his dominions.

The

The following is an Extract from Mr. Elliot's Inſtructions, dated the 18th *of* July, 1778.

"The Nabob, Nizam Ally Cawn, who "has always been connected with the "French, is, from his ſituation, the *natural* "*enemy* of the government of Berar, and "perſonally that of Moodajee."

Mr. Haſtings has a wonderful talent at reconciling natural enemies, and uniting them all againſt the ſingle power of Great Britain in India.

"The points, which appear to us the "moſt likely to excite Moodajee Booſla's "ambition, are the aſſertion of his preten-"ſions to the inheritance of Ram Raja, and "*the recovery of the conqueſts, which have* "*been made from his country by* NIZAM "ALLY.

"The latter is a more diſtant object, and "at this moment appears to us, *foreign* "*from our preſent intereſts.* You may re-"ceive any propoſitions, which he may "make to you on this ſubject. You may "treat

" treat upon them; but you muſt refer them " to *us* for concluſion, *unleſs he ſhall require* " *it* as an indiſpenſible condition of his for- " warding our views in the Weſtern part " of India; and, even in that caſe, your " engagements muſt be confined to the " places originally appertaining to the govern- " ment of Berar, and wreſted from it ſince " the death of Janojee."

Extract from Mr. Francis's Minute on the Inſtructions to Mr. Elliot.

" The ſecond condition, relative to our " aſſiſtance againſt Nizam Ally, is at firſt " ſtated as a ſubject of negociation, to be " referred to *us* for concluſion. But it is " preſently added, *unleſs Moodajee Booſla* " *ſhall require it as an indiſpenſible condition,* " *&c.*—that is, in effect, we tie and unbind " Mr. Elliot in the ſame breath. In the " end, we authoriſe him to agree to ſuch " terms, as may be propoſed by the Raja on " this point, if he, *(Mr. Elliot)* ſhall be per- " ſuaded that the execution of them will " tend to the accompliſhment of our views; " and, in ſuch caſe, he is authoriſed to ful-

" fil

" fil his part of the agreement, *without wait-*
" *ing for our ſanction.*"

Extract from Mr. Wheler's Minute.

" I am at a loſs to conceive, how we ſhall
" be able to fulfil ſtipulations with Moodajee
" Boofla, for forwarding his pretenſions either
" to the dignity of Peſhwa, or to the domini-
" ons ſaid to be taken from him by Nizam
" Ally; how our army is to act or be ſup-
" plied at that diſtance, or what good effect
" ſuch meaſures are to produce, either for the
" defence of Bengal or Bombay, other than
" that of driving thoſe ſtates, from apprehen-
" ſions of our ambitious views, entirely into
" the arms of the French, *and compelling*
" *them to form a general alliance for extir-*
" *pating us from Indoſtan.*"

Mr. Elliot died on his journey, in conſe-
ſequence of a very ſpirited and hazardous
exertion to catch the famous Monſieur Che-
valier, who had eſcaped in diſguiſe from
Chandenagor, and was then making the beſt
of his way to Europe, in order to give the
French miniſtry the earlieſt and moſt accu-

rate

rate information, (which no man poſſeſſed more perfectly than he did) of the ſtate of India, particularly of Bengal. Mr. Elliot was in a bad ſtate of health when he ſet out, and by falling into a river, or being exceſſively wetted while in purſuit of Chevalier, unqueſtionably caught his death. When he was taken and ſent back to Calcutta, the tribute paid to the memory of Mr. Elliot was, that Chevalier was immediately ſet at liberty, and diſpatched expreſs to France, *over land*, by a ſpecial paſſport from Mr. Haſtings, againſt the warmeſt and ſtrong eſtremonſtrances that could be urged by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler. His wife and family, whom he was in too great a hurry to wait for, went round the cape in a Daniſh Indiaman. THESE FACTS ARE ON RECORD.

After Mr. Elliot's death, the *ſame* powers and inſtructions to treat with the *ſuppoſed* Raja of Berar, were transferred and continued to Colonel Goddard; and, for aught that appears to the contrary, are in force to this day. Yet, on the 24th of May, 1779, when it was Mr. Haſtings's object to precipitate a third rupture with the Maratta government

vernment at Poona, and to leave no opening for an accommodation with them, and when it was urged that it would be prudent at leaſt, before we recommenced hoſtilities with a people, *who had never injured us*, to ſecure the friendſhip and aſſiſtance of ſome of the country powers, he then declared, "that Moo-"dajee Booſla's unwillingneſs to join us, was "an additional motive for our preferring a "ſcheme of military operations practicable "by our own force, and *unincumbered with* "*the weight of a timid ally*." Without diſputing the incomparable wiſdom of the reaſon then aſſigned for engaging in a war, without alliances, and for preferring that ſyſtem to any other, it may be proper to obſerve, that this man, ſo deſcribed by Mr. Haſtings, is the very ſame Moodajee Booſla, with whom he has aſſiduouſly laboured to form an offenſive alliance, for no leſs an operation than the conqueſt of the Maratta Empire, and for diveſting the Nizam of the Decan of a third of his dominions.——This is the *ſame timid ally*, whoſe alliance he was ſo paſſionately ſolicitous to obtain, that, on the 23d of November, 1778, he thought he ſhould conciliate his confidence and eſteem

by telling his minister, " *In the whole of my* " *conduct*, I have departed from the common " line of policy, and have made advances, " when others, in my situation, would have " waited for solicitations ;——but I trust to " *the approved bravery and spirit* of your " chief, that he will ardently catch at the " objects presented to his ambition." *(Vide* " *Appendix).*

Again, This is the same *timid ally*, to whom, on the 9th of February, 1779, he made the following *portentous* declaration. " I am sorry that you entertained this dis- " trust, and do declare that, had you accepted " of the terms offered you through Colonel " Goddard, and concluded a treaty with this " government upon them, I should have " held the obligation of it superior to that of " any engagement formed by the govern- " ment of Bombay, and should have thought " it my duty to maintain it, and to defend " the faith of this government pledged for " the performance of it, against *every* con- " sideration, *even of the most valuable interests* " *and safety of the English possessions intrusted* " *to my charge.*"

From May 1779, the Maratta war is ſolely and excluſively his own. The government of Bombay diſcouraged and oppoſed it. In January 1779, they had received a ſevere and bitter leſſon near Poona, when their whole army in effect capitulated, and owed its ſubſequent releaſe and ſafety, to the generoſity and moderation of the Marattas. *They* indeed have ſuffered for their imprudence, as every Indian ſtate has done, that has ever repoſed a confidence in the honour, good faith, or gratitude of the Company's governments in that country.

In juſtice to Mr. Hornby, Preſident of Bombay, it ought to be obſerved, that he thought himſelf bound by a great obligation to *Madajee Scindia*, one of the principal Maratta Chiefs, for the lenity and indulgence, with which the Bombay army was treated. The following extract from his Minute on the occaſion, dated the 19th of February, 1779, will be found to deſerve particular attention.

' There can be no heſitation in declaring " ſuch a convention invalid. Yet we are

" indebted

" indebted to *Madajee Scindia* for our having
" this ſtill left in our power. He, the whole
" army, and we, muſt be equally ſtruck with
" this fact. I do therefore think *our nati-*
" *onal honour* concerned, in finding ſome way
" of acquitting ourſelves to *him*. It is im-
" poſſible to proceed on *ſuch rotten ground*,
" as that of renouncing both the engage-
" ments with the Durbar, and him, who
" enabled us to reject them. *It would be*
" *breaking faith with the whole world at once;*
" *with our friends and with our enemies.*"

Mr. Haſtings alſo, in his Minute of the 24th of May, 1779, ſpeaking of the ſame tranſaction and the ſame perſon, declares that " the obligations of juſtice and honour,
" were pledged for the retribution of *the moſt*
" *ſignal* (though humiliating) act of kind-
" neſs, that a nation could have received
" from the bounty of an individual."

The method taken to acquit the Company and the nation, of their obligations to Madajee Scindia, was to form a plan for the direct invaſion of his country, by another expedition from Bengal, under

the command of Major Camac; on which plan, Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Francis finally broke, in June 1780.

With all the preceding evidence in view, and with much more, which might be collected from the Company's records, can it be doubted, whether it was an eſſential intereſt of the Nizam to counteract and defeat the views of Mr. Haſtings, of which all India was thoroughly appriſed? And if it was impolitic and unjuſt, in the preſidency of Fort St. George, to run the riſque of a quarrel with the Nizam, in June 1779, for ſo inconſiderable an object as the Paſhcuſh, or the immediate poſſeſſion of a diſtrict, which was of courſe to devolve to the Company, on the death of the preſent occupant; by what names are we to qualify the project, formed by Mr. Haſtings in July 1778, for attacking the Nizam in the midſt of a profound peace, and conquering ſuch a portion of his country, as might ſatisfy the ambition of his rival and his enemy? Can it be denied that this project ſtruck directly at the Nizam's exiſtence? Or is it to be ſuppoſed that all his reſentment was reſerved for a ſubſequent and comparatively

tively a petty offence, received from the presidency of Fort St. George, and that he felt no apprehensions or concern for the effects of an union, projected between the government of Bengal and his natural enemy Moodajee Boosla; one of the specific objects of which was, to invade and conquer his dominions. His conduct shews that he perfectly understood his interests, that he dissembled his resentments, while he clearly saw his danger, and wisely provided against it. Certain acts, done afterwards, and declarations made to him by the Presidency of Fort St. George, might possibly have added to his apprehensions, and compleated the measure of his resentment. They might also have furnished the ostensible and immediate pretences for a rupture; because *things done* are in general better evidence *to be held out to the world*, as the motives of action, than things of far greater reach and extent, projected but not executed.

But the question is, whether he had not already taken his resolution, and formed his measures on much more important grounds? An attentive inquiry will soon discover the connexion

connexion between his *real* motives and his actions. A great *effect* evidently exists. A selection of *causes* is presented to our judgment. Shall we ascribe it to a *little* motive, or to a great one? At all events, there is no conceivable argument or principle, on which the proceedings at Fort St. George can be condemned, which will not apply with infinitely greater force, as well from parity of reasoning, as from the singular concurrence of his own authority, to the condemnation of Mr. Hastings.

FINIS.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS, *to* DEWAJUR PUNDIT, *Prime-Minister to the Rajah of Berar, dated in Calcutta, November the 23d 1778.*

"IN the whole of my conduct I have departed from the common line of policy, and have made advances, when others in my situation, would have waited for ſolicitation." As the greateſt advantages, to which I can look, cannot in their nature equal thoſe, to which the proſperous iſſue of our meaſures, may conduct the ſtate of the Maha Rajah's government. But I know the characters to which I addreſs myſelf. *I truſt to the approved bravery and ſpirit of your Chief, that he will ardently catch at the objects preſented to his ambition,* and to your wiſdom; of which, if fame reports truly, no miniſter *ever* poſſeſſed a larger portion, that you will view their importance in too clear a light to hazard the loſs of them, *by attempting to take an advantage of the deſire, which I have expreſſed for their accompliſhment. This intimation is not ſo much intended for a caution to you, as for an explanation of my conduct to thoſe, who may be leſs able to penetrate into the grounds of it.*